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SADC's Responses to Zimbabwe's Political and Economic Security Crisis from 1980 Up To 2020

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Abstract

Zimbabwe's political and economic crisis is one of the most difficult challenges that SADC had to endure for the past three decades. Economically, the country is struggling to revive its economy which had been strained by Western sanctions ever since the First Republic. Most of the young and skilled workforce have left the country for greener pastures. The sanctions imposed by US and Western countries after the fast-track land reform program of 2000 have left the country at the mercy of China and other Eastern countries. Using a qualitative research method, this study sought to identify SADC's challenges and prospects in responding to the political and economic crisis of Zimbabwe. It emerged from the study that the Zimbabwean citizenry cherished the period of the Government of National Unity and would opt that SADC endorse and initiate the same for the good of its regional member

Key Words: SADC, liberation brotherhood, Social justice, Land Reform, Corruption

Introduction

Zimbabwe joined the Southern African Development Community (SADC) since its inception. SADC is a geopolitical association of 16 countries in Southern Africa whose focus is on promoting the economic and political development of affiliate countries within the region (Bell, 2017). SADC is among Africa's highly protuberant regional cooperation bodies and a major power that influences the political, economic, and regional defence subtleties of the continent (Kapinga, 2015). Its establishment agreement was ratified in 1992 in Namibia. Article 5 of the founding Treaty objectives highlights that its role is "to promote and defend peace and security in the sub-region" (SADC Treaty, 1992). SADC's foundation came after the decline in interstate conflict brought about by the post-cold war era. The regional body has its origins in the formation of the Front-Line States and the Southern African Development Coordination Committee (SADCC).

SADC has the mandate to improve the social, economic, and political security of its member countries. Several studies have shown that the impacts of social injustices in the SADC region are deleterious, especially in Zimbabwe. The foundation of Zimbabwe's current political and economic security challenges lies in the historical narratives of colonialism with a special focus on the injustice of land distribution among others (Chitsike, 2003). The ideology of land redistribution has been used to justify Zimbabwe's isolation from the international community. The 1979 Lancaster House constitution failed to bring economic independence to Zimbabwe and the country has continued to suffer political and economic challenges. Often, it argued that Zimbabwe attained political independence without economic independence (Mudadigwa, 2016) as its vast lands remained under the ownership of the white minority even after independence in 1980. After independence, efforts were made by the government to redistribute land using the Lancaster House Agreement (Dugard, 2006, p. 12). This did not solve the problem of landlessness and an agreement was reached between the government of Zimbabwe and Britain which would see Britain compensating the white farmers for the development made on the farms. Unfortunately, and contrary to the

agreement, the United Kingdom under the Labor Party of Tony Blair that came into office in 1997 reneged on the earlier promise to pay compensation in good faith '*pact sunt servanda*' (Musodza, 2015, p. 55).

Several Pan-African writers have argue that Britain violated international law and can be regarded as the culprit in the land reform debate in Zimbabwe (Musodza, 2015). The law that regulates the interactions between countries and other actors, requires states to adhere to agreements because they form the foundation of rules and principles of international law (Mude, 2014). Zimbabwe has made several attempts to resolve the land impasse with no success and it has been the hope and expectation of many people to see the regional body of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) come to the aid of the suffering citizens of Zimbabwe.

The Fast-track land reform program of 2000 led to the imposition of sanctions by the USA and EU on the country in 2001. The government of Robert Mugabe (1980-2017), viewed these sanctions as Western strategies for regime change agenda in Zimbabwe and as means to strengthen the Western-backed opposition parties (Masaka, 2012). However, for some scholars, Zimbabwe's political and economic crisis cannot be attributed to the sanctions debate alone (Sachikonye, 2002, Clemens & Moss, 2005). Rather, some argue in favor of the supposition that puts blame on the wrong policies and governance challenges of the First Republic. This view puts the blame of country's problems on the government's failure to observe the rule of law and individual freedom as well as rampant corruption (Moyo, 2014).

While SADC can be commended for its successful attempts in responding to various forms of the security crisis in the region and in Zimbabwe from 1980-2019, the situation of Zimbabwe remained problematic for SADC (Matlosa, 2009). Zimbabwe's political and economic crisis poses a threat to human security within the state's borders and the region. Political and economic instability are a matter of social justice among the Zimbabwean citizens and the region as they impact on people's well-being. A weak Zimbabwe can prolong the underdevelopment of the region thereby working against the objectives of SADC's collective security foundation. It is the contention of this paper that the Pan-Africanist agenda of land redistribution which has been spearheaded by Zimbabwe and the subsequent land reform program ignited Western sanctions leading to all the social-economic challenges experienced by the country and which SADC is struggling to address.

Literature review

The concept of social justice is relatively new given the fact that this notion is absent in the writings of history's great philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Kant, or Confucius (UN Economic and Social Affairs, 2006). According to the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs, the notion emerged during the industrial revolution as a revolutionary slogan embodying the ideals of progress and fraternity. Social justice has both a universal as well as local relevance (Reisch, 2002). At the universal level, international relations promote social justice through various treaties and protocols under the auspices of international organizations like the United Nations, the African Union, or SADC. At the local level, the nation-state is the context for the evaluation of social justice. It is for this reason that SADC as a regional body has a moral obligation to collectively address challenges of social injustice in its member states.

Van den Bos (2003) describes social justice as the fair and equitable distribution of power, resources, and obligations in society to all people, regardless of race or ethnicity, age, gender, ability status, sexual orientation, and religious or spiritual background. There is a relationship between the concept of social justice and collective well-being (Ayala, Hage, and Wilcox, 2011). Zimbabweans have for a long time been deprived of their ancestral land despite its attainment of independence from British colonial rule in 1980. The injustice of land redistribution has been accompanied by social exclusion and oppression of the majority by the few elites (Chiweshe, 2017).

The main objectives of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are to achieve economic development, peace and security, and growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa, and support the socially disadvantaged through Regional Integration (SADC Treaty, 2019). SADC's modus operandi is influenced by various 'types' of conflict in which the institution has participated and this includes armed regional conflict, electoral conflicts, power discrepancies, and political crisis (Lins de Albuquerque & Hull-Wiklund, 2015). In some cases, SADC responded to such

conflicts through its organ, the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security (also known as the Organ that operates on the premise of promoting peace within Southern Africa) (Mapuva, 2014). This organ is the main SADC's mechanism of dealing with matters of peace and security and the Organ is equivalent to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union or the United Nation Security Council (UNSC). Its main mandate is focused on dealing with inter and intrastate conflicts through the means of negotiation, conciliation, diplomacy, arbitration, and mediation, and even through the usage of military intervention (Neethling 1999). The organizing function of the Organ is vested in the Ministerial Committee that is comprised of ministers of foreign affairs and Ministers of defence from member states (Bell, 2017)

The Zimbabwean crisis presents a test case for SADC's ability to promote the social justice, equality, democracy, respect for human rights, equitable distribution of resources, and political tolerance among others (Masaka 2012). Chief among SADC's headaches in dealing with the Zimbabwean situation are the sanctions imposed by the US and EU starting in 2001. The impact of sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe has a spillover effect on other regional member countries (Ogbonna, 2017). The sanctions have been described as 'targeted' to imply that they put restrictions on key members of the ruling ZANU PF along with their business organizations (Masaka 2012). The targeted individuals and organizations were accused of human rights abuse, censorship of the press, corruption, suppression of the freedom of speech and association, and the failure to respect the rule of law (Raftopoulos, 2009). Over the years, individuals have been relieved of sanctions except for a few.

The use of sanctions as means to achieve political change is not new to the international arena. During the period 1935-36, the League of Nations sanctioned Italy for its continued aggression against Ethiopia, and the United Nations since 1977 sanctioned an arms embargo against South Africa's Apartheid government (Doxey 1983). In recent years, the USA and European Union have used sanctions to compel other nations to yield to international pressure for policy change or affect regime change as witnessed in the cases of Iran, the Soviet Union, Poland, and Argentina (Ndakaripa, 2014). The logic of sanctions is to force a country into internal pressure to either change government, accept specific conditions like good governance, or change decisions in favor of conditional recommendations from individual nations or a particular international community (Hufbauer et al., 2009).

Sanctions are not a new phenomenon in Zimbabwe. Rhodesia under Prime Minister Ian Smith who had imposed a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 was sanctioned by the United Nations with the hope that the country will give in to international pressure to abdicate self-imposed independence. Despite the imposition of sanctions, Rhodesians did not suffer an economic crisis which most scholars have used as proof that economic sanctions as political tools intended to effect political change against a sovereign state do not always achieve expected results (Schmidt 1988). Sanctions against Rhodesia were not only ineffective in achieving their intended objectives, but they worsened the situation by increasing the vulnerability of the people they purported to protect.

The sanction by USA and EU on Zimbabwe are said to be 'targeted' (directed at individuals, not the country), and called for changes in land reform policies and improvement in creating democratic spaces and good governance (Ndakaripa, 2014). Several debates have been raised on whether the sanctions were really targeted at individuals. What is evident is that Zimbabwe's economy has been badly affected by the sanctions. Among the negative effects of the sanctions are the total withdrawal of financial aid to Zimbabwe by the WB and IMF. Accordingly, foreign investment seized drastically with major FDI declining. Industries stopped functioning due to lack of capital and many Zimbabweans left the country seeking employment in other countries and across the continent.

Since the introduction of sanctions in 2000, SADC member states were hesitant to speak out loudly against the impacts of the sanctions on the people of Zimbabwe. The regional block started supporting the call for the removal of sanctions by speaking collectively through a communique issued on the 25th of October 2019. In the communique, the Regional Block expressed concern over the impact of the sanctions on Zimbabwe noting that, "The sanctions have proved to be directly affecting entities beyond the so-called targeted individuals and have a negative impact on the credibility of Zimbabwe and serious trickle-down effects on

the economy and people of Zimbabwe, and by extension, the SADC Region” (SADC, 2019, no. 2). This was the first time that a collective call was made on behalf of Zimbabwe.

The call by SADC was received with mixed feelings despite its acknowledgment of the dire situation that the sanctions have placed on the people of Zimbabwe. Within the government circles, it was a victorious moment as it brought some hope for a financial bailout. However, some political and economic commentators have criticized the one-sided call by SADC to the international community without a call for the government of Zimbabwe to address the internal challenges of good governance, corruption, and protection of human rights which were attached to the sanctions (Gruzd and Lalbahadur, 2020). Protagonists of this positions argue that SADC’s sin of omission has given a form of political endorsement to the government of Zimbabwe to hide behind the sanctions call while giving a blind ear to the internal processes behind the sanctions curse.

SADC demonstrated that it is constrained in its effort to influence Zimbabwe in dealing with issues of social justice due to the notion of state sovereignty (Slim, 2010). The notion of state sovereignty was muted in early 1648 at the Treaty of Westphalia and it found its way into the United Nations Charter under Article 2(7). However, the principle of state sovereignty which is based on the idea of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another country cannot be justified in the case of SADC to act against a member country as it would not tantamount to interference (Gusha, 2019). SADC has the right to promote peace and security within the block and Zimbabwe is a member of the Regional organ. Zimbabwe has always sung the mantra of ‘we are a sovereign nation’ sending signals to other nations to be cautious in their attempt to interfere in the domestic politics of the country.

Methodology

This article assessed SADC’s social, moral, and political responsibilities in responding to the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe from 1980 to 2020. The study was guided by the social justice theory. The research used an interpretivism paradigm while the design was explanatory, and the approach used was qualitative. The target population for the study were individuals working in organizations that operate in the Southern African Development Community as diplomatic attachés, members of non-governmental organizations with a regional focus, retired members of the military forces who once participated in SADC operation, members of the academia and members of political parties in Zimbabwe. A sample population of 20 respondents was selected using the purposive sampling method and data was collected using an interview schedule.

Findings and discussions

Findings from the study showed that SADC does not have a policy framework to deal with political disputes among member countries. The regional block has rules and guidelines on how an election should be conducted and the supporting monitoring systems. However, there are no frameworks to deal with political contestations where parties fail to agree on the outcome of elections. In 2000, Zimbabwe held some controversial elections in which SADC, dissenting from the view of the SADC Parliamentary Forum, the Commonwealth, and the EU, declared them ‘legitimate expression of the people’s will’. The same sentiments were raised about the 2008 elections when political violence followed the first round of presidential elections in 2008. A runoff was called for that was marred by violence which neither SADC nor the AU declared credible or legitimate. This supports the view that the lack of a policy framework that spells out how to deal with such political contestations means SADC may not fully provide support for the creation of an environment conducive for political and social justice in a member country (Cawthra, 2010).

This can be contrasted with the political achievements of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) which managed to resolve the political crisis in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea in 2015 (ECOWAS 2015 Annual Report). More important, ECOWAS managed to resolve the political crisis in the Gambia using illegal ‘coercive diplomacy’ (Williams, 2017) when the then former President Yaya Jammeh who had conceded defeat on 2nd December 2016 changed his mind to contest the election results after seven days. ECOWAS passed a resolution that was supported by African Union and United Nations Security Council. Jammeh was given an ultimatum that led to the swearing-in of Adama Barrow as the new

president of Gambia (Hartmann, 2017). Unlike ECOWAS, SADC has never used threats of force against its member countries apart from the crisis in DRC and Lesotho (Mutisi, 2016).

The question of land reform is an extremely delicate area for SADC to handle within the Zimbabwean context. While most Pan-Africanists seem to agree that the land reform program was a necessary intervention, others feel the manner of executing the program is what was seen problematic. The violent land seizure that started in 2000 ignited several problems for Zimbabwe including sanctions by the USA and EU. When the case was brought to the SADC tribunal which ruled in favor of white farmers, Zimbabwe refused to honor the ruling of the Tribunal on technical grounds (Matyszak, 2011). SADC as a regional body did not have a pragmatic solution to land redistribution for all its member countries and the Fast Track Land Resettlement Programme in Zimbabwe that began in 2000 gave the regional block a rude awakening to the continued neo-colonialism in the form of control over African resources. There is a general belief that SADC countries feared that sanctions may be extended to their nations should they openly support the Zimbabwean position.

One of SADC's challenges in addressing issues of social justice in Zimbabwe is the historical vestiges of the liberation movements often dubbed the liberation brotherhood. Africa's historic colonial past brought nation-states together as they fought for their liberation. The support that states gave each other towards liberation lived years after the attainment of independence. Consequently, there is a feeling that a threat to the liberation ideals of one country, will have a ripple effect on all, and hence the need to stand by the ideologies of the liberation movements in every country. SADC as a group of countries with similar historical backgrounds felt obliged to protect liberation movements against unfair criticisms especially from former colonial states and opposition movements which they accuse of having international neo-colonial financial support. As Gumede (2017) points out, the hegemony of power in most independent African states was passed on to new states creating some form of common brotherhood. The question of brotherhood is not negative given the fact that some regional blocks like the European Union capitalize on their unity to achieve economic and political growth. However, regional unity becomes negative when it fails to promote the rights of citizens in member countries. SADC has the necessary tools in the form of protocols to address the economic and political challenges of member countries but what is lacking is the political will to break the negative elements of the liberation movement brotherhood syndrome.

Of significance in SADC's attempts to influence matters of social justice is the quest for the promotion of basic freedoms, especially the media reforms. Zimbabwe needs media reforms as enshrined in its constitution. The government has overlooked the changes treasured in the revised constitution that allows for democratic media reforms but which the government is dragging its feet to implement. SADC has not spoken boldly against the injustices reported in the press though they are enshrined in the SADC protocols ratified by Zimbabwe. As Gwagwa and Wiltone (2014) have pointed out, member states have the role to ensure international protocols and statutes are domesticated. However, SADC can only influence but not force any state to adhere to such principles.

It also emerged from this study that SADC countries are divided on what action to take against Zimbabwe given Zimbabwe's insistence that its problems are caused by sanctions illegally imposed by the United States and the WEST. Under such circumstances, SADC is caught between supporting Zimbabwe's Pan-African cause on one hand and advocating political reforms on the other hand. This is why Masaka (2012) referred to this problem as 'the paradox of sanctions' in Zimbabwe. Due to the differences in their democratic systems of governance and national values, the perception of democracy somehow differs from one SADC state to the other which makes it difficult for the block to have a common position of what action to take against Zimbabwe. It is worth noting that the political and economic crisis of Zimbabwe presents new challenges that SADC and the whole world have never encountered. No former colonized county has ever tried to repossess their land as a matter of social justice. Consequently, Zimbabwe appeared to be setting a dangerous precedence for other countries in the SADC region.

Corruption emerged as one of the chief triggers of economic challenges in Zimbabwe that SADC is failing to address. While corruption is a worldwide phenomenon, the crisis in Zimbabwe has proved to be endemic. SADC Protocol against Corruption clearly states that each party must develop its legal frameworks with no

provision for external interference. Transparency International has placed Zimbabwe among the worst corrupt countries of the world (Transparency International, 2018, p 3). At one time, former president Robert Mugabe claimed that about US\$15 Billion from Marange Diamond fields had disappeared (Global Witness, 2017). Also, Former Finance Minister Tendai Biti claimed that at least US\$1 billion in diamond-related revenue owed to the national treasury remains unaccounted for (Martin, 2012). The total amount of money that Zimbabwe is losing to corruption, is enough to fund the infrastructure development needs of the country. SADC is aware that much of Zimbabwe's crisis emanates from the rampant corruption among the top echelons of the country. Unfortunately SADC cannot forcefully deal with the question of corruption since every country has its own legal instruments to address it.

There is a feeling among the Zimbabwean populace that the country is under state capture by the powerful businessmen who use their proximity to leadership to manipulate the country's economic and political discourse. The case of powerful individuals within governments is common in many countries. However, the paradox of state capture is difficult to analyze because the perpetrators often provide essential support to the government under critical conditions and then demand compensation beyond their contribution. These individuals or organizations do not possess bad intentions always. They only turn bad when their influence makes the people worse off while they gain economically. State capture is part of the corruption and hence difficult for SADC to deal with. Like Njomeni (2019) claimed, it calls for political will to deal with issues of corruption and state capture.

Recommendations

In order to deal with the political and economic challenges in Zimbabwe, SADC must facilitate another Global Political Agreement. SADC needs to avoid piecemeal solutions to the political crisis in Zimbabwe. It must face the reality that most alternative solutions have been tried but failed. It can no longer avoid the uncomfortable conclusions about invalid elections or the timid peace treaty of the Global Political Agreement. It needs to proffer a carefully designed and mediated negotiation process leading to a broadly accepted transitional arrangement or a range of fundamental reforms; both political and economic, and then an election that leads to no dispute over the result. SADC must understand that the situation in Zimbabwe is not going to be solved overnight. Neither can the people of Zimbabwe solve it by themselves. What it means is that those elites who are benefiting from the system will make sure the country does not stabilize. Only SADC's intervention through a transitional arrangement that includes all contesting parties might solve the challenge.

Second, SADC should revive its Tribunal's mandate to handle lawsuits brought by parties. The Tribunal was an important organ that could have given SADC regional integrity but was made powerless when Zimbabwe refused to honor its judgment on the basis that it had reasonable evidence that the tribunal was illegal and erring in its judgments. SADC should ensure it has reasonable arguments to enforce its judgments and ensure member countries who disregard its ruling receive appropriate sanctions. The Zimbabwean SADC Tribunal judgment is one unfortunate case that sets bad precedence in the future. Zimbabwe played a diplomatic game with SADC and in the future, SADC should ensure such cases don't repeat themselves. The Tribunal is the only means by which member countries can be called to account. According to Nathan (2013, p. 870), the disbanding of the SADC Tribunal shows SADC's hierarchy of values, "in terms of which the organization's formal commitment to human rights as a regional legal order is subordinate to the political imperatives of regime solidarity and respect for sovereignty." In the absence of a legal framework for policy enforcement, SADC risk failing to achieve its objective of collective security within the region.

Third, SADC must encourage the ratification and alignment of domestic laws with SADC protocols in Zimbabwe. It is essential that members of regional bodies abide by regional protocols. The EU block is powerful because of its unitary policy-making body, the EU Parliament. SADC should move towards such levels if it must be respected by member countries. SADC can help by ensuring that Zimbabwe aligns its laws to the SADC protocols. The problem of human rights affects the lives of ordinary people in Zimbabwe. The logic of this argument is that once Zimbabwe aligns its laws with SADC protocols and the new

constitution, it will level the political playing field. However, the government seems to be dragging its feet and this is where SADC intervention becomes urgent. Relevant SADC protocols that need urgent domestication in Zimbabwe include the Protocol of Gender and Development 2008, Protocol on Politics, Défense and security cooperation 2001, and protocol against corruption 2001.

Fourth, Zimbabwean leaders denounce external interference in the internal politics of the country even from SADC member states on issues of governance but beg their support against sanctions. SADC would need to devise monitoring mechanisms for leadership accountability over state resources within the region. SADC should never dream of solving the Zimbabwean crisis outside the question of corruption. Corruption in Zimbabwe is not a regional issue but a national problem. The Anti-corruption commission has been accused of ‘catch and release’ on high-profile cases without finalizing them. Article 8 of the SADC Protocol on corruption talks of how member countries can assist in the confiscation and freezing of proceeds acquired through corrupt means and hidden in member countries only. Consequently, the SADC protocol on corruption has very little utility in curbing corruption. The SADC protocol on corruption has limited powers to help enforce its articles. According to the OECD strategies to curb corruption, SADC needs to come up with protocols that curb the risk of policy capture (OECD, 2016).

While dealing with corruption can be argued as an internal process that SADC might not find relevant to its role, the Zimbabwean corruption cases are highly correlated with the political situation of the country. The state newspaper, Herald reported on the 28th of April 2020, that the Zimbabwe Anti-corruption Commission chairperson, Justice Loice Matanda-Moyo bemoaned the interference in the commission’s work by high political forces (Herald, 2020). Consequently, the use of political immunity to corruption arrest is facilitating the deterioration of the Zimbabwean economy. SADC comes in handy by providing mechanisms for accountability including the promotion of democratic space to allow for the election of new leadership. Elections allow for the removal of leaders perceived to be corrupt and the election of new leaders. Some political leaders in Zimbabwe no longer respect the role of the Anti-Corruption Commission due to their capacity to override the country’s judicial system. In June 2019, one Cabinet Minister refused to answer questions in court with no penalty given (The Zimbabwe Mail, 2019)

Fifth, the most unlikely solution suggested by some people is for South Africa to use its economic power to bring about a settlement in Zimbabwe. This might come in the form of economic sanctions against Zimbabwe. This proposal is very unlikely because South Africa benefits economically from Zimbabwe’s crisis. Such a move will be political and economic suicide for South Africa. Zimbabwe might have failed to provide basic services, pay civil service salaries, and provide even a modicum of financial stability but has remained operational, and its security institutions have remained largely intact. The worst-case scenario from South Africa’s point of view would be to see a slide by Zimbabwe into civil war or anarchy, with the disintegration of the security services and the compartmentalization or total collapse of the state into warring factions as happened in Liberia, Sierra Leone, or Somalia. South Africa will do everything in its power to prevent such a scenario. SADC countries cannot decide to close their borders to Zimbabwe when they are benefiting from its chaos through trade and immigrant manpower skills from Zimbabwe.

Last, SADC must acknowledge and speak openly about Zimbabwe’s own contributions to its challenges outside international sanctions. The recent claim by SADC that the Zimbabwean problems are a product of prolonged sanctions imposed on the country by Western nations is correct but inadequate. The affirmation that sanctions “are a fundamental constraint and hindrance to the country’s prospects of economic recovery, human security, and sustainable growth” might be taken to imply that all other fundamentals in Zimbabwe are in place (Mhaka, 2022). This comes against the call by African National Congress (ANC) president Cyril Ramaphosa’s declaration that his party is determined to resolve various political and developmental challenges across Africa. While acknowledging the negative impacts of sanctions against Zimbabwe, SADC should tackle the governance situation of the country. Zimbabwe’s challenges cannot be solved without recourse to the other internal challenges like electoral reforms, corruption, and other legislative reforms.

Conclusion

There is a lot that SADC can do to help Zimbabwe improve the political, economic, and social welfare of the people. This study has noted that SADC must enhance its monitoring mechanism against member countries that flout regional protocols and make it explicit. Zimbabwe needs to be convinced that the political crisis of the country is dependent on political reforms. SADC must make it clear that unless the governance issues are solved, the country will not recover. SADC as a regional body must move away from paying lip service to the brotherhood syndrome of supporting liberation movements that deny their people political freedom without taking steps to improve the welfare of the citizens. By not denouncing bad governance, SADC is going against its own principles. The regional body must openly let Zimbabwe understand that it is responsible for solving its problems. SADC must promote democratic elections in all member countries. It must use its influence to encourage free and fair elections.

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